Thursday, April 17, 2008
More on Fashionable Nonsense
For example, according to Sokal, the following definition is 'meaningless'
'a limit is defined as that which is greater than one point and less than another but in no case equal to the point of departure, to sketch it for you quickly.'
This is clearly meaningful, in fact I can hazard to say I know damn well what he means by this.
'Let us call a limit any point such x that if Y (the 'point of departure') is a specified unique set X is not an element of Y and X is not the empty set.' He may wish to say something else (if he is trying to talk about limit points in topology, he must clarify a good deal more. This could be the case, if what he means by 'point of departure' and 'point of arrival' is the boundary of the relevant open set. He would then have imprecisely restated the correct definition, which is here. Greater than one point and less than another but in no case equal to the point of departure or the point of arrival is an awkward way of saying that it is 'in the middle' - a limit point is a point x in a Subset S of topological space X such that - to simplify- if you draw a small circle around x that doesn't contain anything outside of S it will always contain a point of S other than itself ), and his formulation may not be precise, but I maintain that i have come up with an unambiguous and meaningful re-statement of Lacan's text.
Not too tough, is it? I came up with the re-statement in about five seconds, and found all the relevant information about topology on wikipedia within the space of a few minutes. Given the (alluded to) time constraints of this kind of seminar and the fact that Lacan was, if nothing else, a pretty bright MD who forgot more formal training in math than I've ever had , I think its probably better to go with one of the two more charitable readings. The seminar may not be one of the brightest moments in the history of the pedagogy of Mathematics (Lacan was not much of a teacher), but the particular passage is either well-formed but unrelated to topology or poorly formed and correct. In any case, this example of Lacanian prose is clearly not schizophasiac (for example, his terms retain their meaning over time), which is what we usually mean by 'gibberish'. So we now wonder what exactly does Sokal mean when he calls something 'meaningless' or 'gibberish'. We can start by examining a case where he clearly believes that posited terms are meaningful. When Sokal wishes to define his own terms, he guarantees their meaning first by asserting that they are meaningful (and they indeed are), then by pointing out that they rely on a long chain of relations to already clearly and specifically defined terms.
Of course, one COULD be led to wonder how this meaning is ultimately guaranteed (indeed, at first blush this seems to lead to vicious regress), but, like good Saussureans, we know that a universe of discourse is a given. Sokal's S's (sound-images) corresponds to his s's (concepts) relationally - so 'compactness 'is 'meaningful' because it fails to be any other (synchronically or diachronically) substitutable S/s relation. So we may not know what Sokal means by meaning, but we at the very least know how he manages to mean it. As an added bonus, we have also explained (should Alan Sokal read this blog, which is unlikely) what another 'meaningless' Lacanian formula (S/s) means. Remember kids, Lacan helps you read Sokal on Lacan.
When it isn't enough to be controversial
| Quote:
Since the function of (static-Visual) Art has now been divorced more or less completely from its product, and both from its craft, what is left for Art to do? Political art is a joke - antisystemic actors and the world-system elite share a complete disregard for it. Of course, artists can still *piss people off*, and that seems to be about all that (at least most of them) do. Ms. Schvarts probably thinks she is making some sort of political statement here, something about choice, or a Woman's Body, (pick a liberal feminist hobby horse and run). What she is actually doing is using the resources of a kind of superexploitation that is only beginning to be adumbrated (the US relative to its economic hosts) in order to re-present her own blood (in a double sense - actual blood and her aborted progeny) in its commodity form. I wonder if, as a man, I am entitled to, uh, risk daring hypothesis*: despite its feminist pretensions, Schvarts' work is actually the latest word in misogyny. What we are treated to is a glimpse at the brutal inner kernel of the liberal feminist ego ideal - a bloody, masochistic 'death Mother' whose function is to convert anonymous sperm into defective, non-functional children. This is why, pace the claims of what passes for a left in this country liberal feminism cannot be safely quarantined from the rest of Enlightenment poisons. Just as populist democracy takes the malformed images of the peasantry developed by the old feudal elites and says "wow, I want to BE that", so does liberal feminism identify wholly with fundamentally misogynist libidinal structures. The thesis is that all women ARE mothers or whores, with the proviso that whores are awesome. *Zizek said this, in these words, in the Pervert's Guide to Cinema. I aped him because I think its funny. |
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Presumed Idiotic
"Perhaps only a mathematical genius could propose these insights? Don't buy into the con, Sokal and Bricmont advise. When he tosses tori and square roots in with penises and neuroses, Lacan is betting that a math-induced brain freeze will suspend the critical faculties of his audience. Not so readily bamboozled, the authors of ``Fashionable Nonsense'' expose Lacan's mathematical antics as ``showing off a superficial erudition and manipulating meaningless sentences.''
That sounds pretty right on. After all, Lacan's audience was made up primarily of dim bulbs like this fella. Are we expected to believe that not only did Lacan completely make up all of his reference to higher Maths, but that he put such nonsense over on a gentleman who studied under Husserl and David Hilbert? Weird.
And More
A final, rather striking, example of the re-discovered role of emotion is in the field
of sleep and dream research. When REM sleep and its near-perfect correlation with
dreaming were discovered in the 1950s, and the related brain-stem mechanism
discovered in the 1970s (Hobson and McCarley, 1977), Freud’s (1900) dream theory
appeared to lose all scientific credibility. However, more recent research has revealed
that dreaming and REM sleep are doubly dissociable states, controlled by distinct (but
interactive) brain mechanisms (Solms, 1997). Dreaming turns out to be generated by a
network of forebrain structures centered principally around ascending dopamine
systems (see Solms 1997, 2000 for review).
Importantly, dreaming stops completely when fibers in the ventromesial frontal lobes
are severed, after lesion to exactly the same brain region as that targetted in pre-frontal
leucotomy. This is, of course, the same system that mediates powerful positive
emotions (Panksepp, 1998), and is also centrally implicated in hallucinations and
delusions that share many formal features with dreams (Silbersweig et al, 1995). The
landscape of dreaming research, especially as regards emotion, has radically changed,
and it would appear, based on modern findings, that Freud’s classical has much to
recommend it.
This opens the fascinating possibility that emotion may play a generative role in all
classes of false belief states: from dreaming in the neurologically-healthy, to changes
seen after focal brain lesions, and also encompassing the pharmacologically-sensitive
disorders that are central to the several psychiatric states with delusional features. The
empirical foundation for such a grand claim remains limited, but it offers the prospect
of a tempting unification of findings across wide domains.
Ask and it Shall be Given
B13 1992: There is a parallel of the CCRTs about the therapist with the CCRTs about other people.
A necessary and expected parallel is based on Freud's (1912) central clinical observation about the transference template: the patterns that become expressed to the therapist have parallels with the pattern that is expressed to other people. Now, for the very first time, this parallel has been empirically shown for 35 patients from the Penn Psychotherapy Project between the CCRT for relationships with others and the CCRT for relationships with the therapist (Fried, Crits-Christoph, & Luborsky (1992).
The broader issue of the consistency of themes across different types of people, such as father versus mother, has been examined by Frevert et al (1995). This broader topic is basic to the CCRT because of the partly research-supported clinical expectation that narratives about different types of people will show some common themes across the different types of people.
They can feel free to thank me (and google, which actually turns this piece up on the first page for a search of empirical + transference) later.